| Kopel - What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amemdment |
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NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW VOLUME 29, NO. 4, PAGES 823-847 (2002) What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment by David B. Kopel[i][1] I. Introduction It is well-settled that state constitutions can serve as an aid to interpreting the federal Bill of Rights.[ii][2]Regarding the Second Amendment, state constitutions are especially helpful. First, right to arms provisions are contained in forty-four state constitutions.[iii][3] Few parts of the Bill of Rights have as many state analogues as does the Second Amendment.[iv][4] Second, the state language has been written or amended from 1776 until the present,[v][5] so we can see how arms rights have or have not changed in a wide variety of American linguistic communities. Third, state arms guarantees have been created or amended by special conventions, by state legislatures, and by initiative and referenda. Thus, we can see how arms rights language is created by both elite and non-elite types of lawmakers. A great deal of ink has been spilled trying to discern the intent of the authors of the Second Amendment. If we simply look at how the same words in the Second Amendment have been used in state constitutions, we find that these words have had a stable, consistent meaning throughout American history. From 1776 until the present, the words have guaranteed a right of individuals to own and carry guns. At least regarding gun rights, modern Americans speak the same language as the founders. Since 1963, the people of Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have chosen, either through their legislature or through a direct vote, to add a right to arms to their state constitution, to re-adopt the right to arms, or to strengthen an existing right. In every state where the people have had the opportunity to vote directly, they have voted for the right to arms by overwhelming margins. In this article, I examine each of the state constitutions that contain an arms rights guarantee. For each state, I detail how the state arms right has been interpreted and what implications about the Second Amendment may be drawn from the language of the state provision. Throughout the analysis, several key questions recur: · When the Second Amendment was written and adopted, was the language chosen already familiar as guaranteeing and individual’s right to keep and bear arms, or was the language familiar as protecting the power of states over their own militias? · Is the phrase “bear arms” a term of art referring exclusively to bearing arms while in militia service, or is the phrase used in its more ordinary sense to encompass bearing arms for a variety of purposes, such as personal or family defense or sporting purposes? · When states adopted the Second Amendment verbatim in their own state constitutions, what did this particular language do? · What is the effect when concerns about standing armies are expressed contemporaneously or even in the same sentence as arms rights language? · What is the implication when states create explicit exceptions to the right to arms, such as excepting the concealed carrying of weapons, or excepting large assemblies of armed men, or reserving the power to create certain types of gun laws? I. State Constitutions Contemporaneous with the Second Amendment The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution was written in 1789 and sent by Congress to the States for ratification.[vi][6] Ratification was achieved in 1791.[vii][7] Four state constitutions from the very early Republic -- Pennsylvania’s first constitution, adopted in 1776, stated in its Declaration of Rights: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination, to, and governed by, the civil power.”[ix][9] It is sometimes claimed that the phrase “bear arms” in the Second Amendment is a term of art referring only to bearing arms while serving in a militia.[x][10] Both in 1790 and 1776, the drafters in A recent opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggests that “bear arms” continues to encompass carrying guns for diverse purposes.[xiii][13] Analyzing the statutory phrase “carries a firearm,” she wrote: Surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution's Second Amendment (“keep and bear Arms”) and Black's Law Dictionary indicate, “wear, bear, or carry...upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose...of being armed and ready for offensive or defense action in case of a conflict with another person.”[xiv][14]
The 1776 adoption of the phrase “the people have a right to bear arms” precedes James Madison's derivative use of a substantially similar phrase when he wrote the Second Amendment in 1789.[xx][20] The 1776 North Carolina Constitution declares the right is “for the defence of the State,” but delineates no other purpose.[xxi][21] This “right to bear arms” language is included in the same sentence as denunciations of and restrictions on standing armies. This language would be expected to lend strong support to arguments that the Second Amendment was intended exclusively to promote state militias so as to reduce the power of the federal standing army[xxii][22] and that the only purpose of the Second Amendment is collective defense, not individual arms possession for personal defense.[xxiii][23] However, the North Carolina Constitution has always been, without dissent, construed to guarantee a right of ordinary citizens to carry weapons for personal protection.[xxiv][24] The language of the state constitution, unlike the Second Amendment, explicitly denounces and controls standing armies and specifies only one purpose for the right to bear arms: “the defence of the state.”[xxv][25] A fortiori, the 1776 North Carolina Constitution would protect, at most, people in active militia service, but in 1843, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained that “[f]or any lawful purpose -- either of business or amusement -- the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry his gun.”[xxvi][26] In 1868, after the Civil War, Again, if the federal Second Amendment is only about controlling standing armies, then the 1868 The individual nature of the 1868 Therefore, from the North Carolina Constitution, we see: · Concerns about standing armies do not negate the individual nature of the arms right. · A reference to "the defence of the state" does not negate the individual nature of the arms right. · The creation of an exception to allow restrictions on concealed carry underscores the nature of the arms right. · The exact wording of the Second Amendment is interpreted as recognizing an individual right in These themes will be continually supported by examination of other state constitutions. The year after the Second Amendment became the law of the land, In 1822, a Kentucky Supreme Court decision declared a law against carrying concealed weapons invalid.[xxxv][35] This led to an 1850 revision in the Kentucky Constitution to allow restrictions on concealed carry.[xxxvi][36] This was also the basis for the restrictions on concealed carry written into many state constitutions. The final form of the All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties. . . . Seventh: The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.[xxxvii][37] II. Is the Second Amendment Mainly about Federalism? Having examined some very early states’ right to arms guarantees, let us now jump ahead to 1959 and to the last states that joined the It is sometimes argued that the Second Amendment right belongs only to state militias, to protect them from disarmament by the federal government.[xli][41] The guarantees made by the In 1994, the people of In South Carolina, the state constitutional right to arms, with the exact same language as the Second Amendment, is read just as it is in Alaska, Hawaii, and North Carolina: as guaranteeing a right of individuals to bear arms. If Second Amendment language were about state’s rights, rather than about individual rights, then surely one would expect the state’s rights interpretation to prevail in
Having examined constitutions from very old states to the newest states, let us now look at the constitutions of the rest of the states. We will proceed mostly, in alphabetical order, although some states will be combined where profitable. We will find great diversity of geography and time, and will we find consistent support for the themes established in Parts I and II. The Washington and Arizona Constitutions make explicit a principle which has been considered implicit in the Second Amendment: protection of an individual right “to bear arms” does not forbid the government from controlling large assemblies of armed men.[lvi][57] Just a few years before the Washington Constitution was adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state ban on armed parades in public, even as the Court plainly treated the Second Amendment as an individual right protected against federal infringement.[lvii][58] An 1842 case interpreted the state constitution narrowly, holding that it protected only the kind of people who might serve the militia, i.e. free males, and only the kind of weapons suitable for militia use.[lix][60] A concurring opinion stated that “The provision of the Federal Constitution [and of the state Constitution] . . . is but an assertion of that general right of sovereignty belonging to independent nations, to regulate their military force.”[lx][61] This concurrence was never followed in Thus, the Again, the phrase “keep and bear arms” is used for more than militia use. The Colorado Constitution shows that a person may “keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property.”[lxviii][69] The Florida: As enacted in 1968, Florida’s provision states: “(a) The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law."[lxxiv][76] Earlier versions were: 1838: “That the free white men of this State shall have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”[lxxv][77] 1868: “The people shall have the right to bear arms in defence of themselves and of the lawful authority of the State.”[lxxvi][78] 1885: “The right of the people to bear arms in defence of themselves and the lawful authority of the State, shall not be infringed, but the Legislature may prescribe the manner in which they may be borne.”[lxxvii][79] The people of Again, language nearly identical to the Second Amendment is used to guarantee a right of individuals.[lxxx][82] Before The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well‑regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security of free State.[lxxxii][84] The Nunn decision was consistent with every nineteenth century Supreme Court case, every state court case[lxxxiii][85] and every legal treatise which discussed the Second Amendment. Throughout the nineteenth century, it was undisputed that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right of every citizen to own and carry firearms.[lxxxiv][86] Idaho: The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on the person nor prevent passage of legislation providing minimum sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent the passage of legislation providing penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, nor prevent the passage of any legislation punishing the use of a firearm. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammunition. Nor shall any law permit the confiscation of firearms, except those actually used in the commission of a felony.[lxxxv][87] Once more, language which tracks the Second Amendment is used to protect an individual right. [lxxxvi][88] This is another modern usage of language from the Second Amendment to protect the rights of individual citizens, and another usage of “bear arms” outside an exclusively military context.[lxxxviii][90] As the 1816 Indiana Constitution shows, one major rationale for the right to arms in the early republic was concern about the dangers of standing armies.[xci][93] That is why the people of In State v. Friel, decided in 1986, the Maine Supreme Court read the 1819 language as guaranteeing only a "collective" right.[xcix][101] Like "collective property" in a Communist country, the “collective” right to arms favored by the Friel court really belonged exclusively to the government. Thus, this “collective” right was antithetical to the ordinary American understanding of rights as belonging to individuals, not governments. The people of If “to keep and bear arms” is a “term of art” used to mean militia service only,[cii][104] that “art” must have been entirely unknown to the people who drafted the state constitutions of the early American republic, for those drafters used “keep and bear arms” again and again to protect the right of individuals to possess and carry firearms for personal defense. The concealed weapon restriction underscores that “the right to keep and bear arms” includes the right to carry non-concealed firearms for personal protection. The 1820 provision stated: “That the people have the right peaceably to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those vested with the powers of government for redress of grievances by petition or remonstrance; and that their right to bear arms in defence of themselves and of the State cannot be questioned.”[cvi][108] This language described “the people” as possessing “the right peaceably to assemble for their common good” and “their right to bear arms.”[cvii][109] That the right to assemble was specified as being “for their common good” did not, of course, mean that the right did not belong to individuals, or that the right was a “collective” right which belonged only to the government. Likewise, as has been shown, the provision in many state constitutions mentioning only “the common defense” in the arms guarantee has almost always been interpreted to recognize a right of individuals. The 1876 U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Cruikshank, also treated the right to assemble and the right to bear arms in pari materia.[cviii][110] Both were rights “found wherever civilization exists,” both were recognized but not created by the Constitution, and neither were within the power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against infringement by private persons.[cix][111] All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof. To secure these rights, and the protection of property, governments are instituted among people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.[cxi][114] All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person, family, property, and the state, and for lawful hunting, recreational, and other lawful purposes, which shall not be infringed.[cxii][115] Like The vote to include these rights shows the continued importance of the right to arms to Americans. These votes also show modern usage of “the right to keep and bear arms” as encompassing the individual possession and carrying of arms for a variety of purposes, not just militia service. The constitutional right to arms provisions , New Hampshire, Nebraska, and Montana were adopted as early as 1889 and as late as 1988,[cxxiii][126] but each constitution uses "right to keep and bear arms" to refer unmistakably to an individual right to arms. The usage reflects the shared understanding of the vast majority of the American people that the same phrase in the Second Amendment likewise guarantees a right to every responsible citizen. The popular votes in favor of creating and strengthening these provisions attest to the perceived contemporary importance of the right to keep and bear arms. The 1851 phrase “for their defense and security” apparently served as a model for Oklahoma: Oklahoma copied Colorado’s provision “The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.”[cxxviii][131] In [cxli][144] the court expanded upon Aymette. The court began by opining that the Tennessee Constitution and the Second Amendment, while not identically worded, had the same meaning.[cxlii][145] The The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase them, to keep them in a state of efficiency for use, and to purchase and provide ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep them in repair. And clearly for this purpose, a man would have the right to carry them to and from his home, and no one could claim that the Legislature had the right to punish him for it, without violating this clause of the Constitution. But farther than this, it must be held, that the right to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right to use such arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes usual in the country, and to which arms are adapted, limited by the duties of a good citizen in times of peace . . . What, then, is he protected in the right to keep and thus use? Not every thing that may be useful for offense or defense; but what may properly be included or understood under the title of arms, taken in connection with the fact that the citizen is to keep them, as a citizen[cxliii][146]. . . . [W]e would hold, that the rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, and repeater, are such arms . . . . [cxliv][147] Like some scholars of today, the Tennessee Attorney General recognized that the Tennessee Constitution and the Second Amendment have been more concerned with the balance of power in a free society than with individual protection against common criminals. Accordingly, the Attorney General argued that right to arms was a “political right.”[cxlv][148] In the legal discourse of 1870s, a “political right” could be restricted without limit by the political branch, the legislature, whereas a “civil right” was inviolate. The fails to distinguish between the nature of the right to keep, and its necessary incidents, and the right to bear arms for the common defense. Bearing arms for the common defense may well be held to be a political right, or for protection and maintenance of such rights, intended to be guaranteed; but the right to keep them, with all that is implied fairly as an incident to this right, is a private individual right, guaranteed to the citizen, not the soldier.[cxlvi][149] Accordingly, even when “bear arms” is read in its narrowest sense, as the Texas: “Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime.”[cxlviii][151] Like many other states, In 1971, the people of Some scholars read the Second Amendment as if it contains only the first clause, concerning the militia. Yet this misreading ignores the fact that when Virginians wanted to add an explicit individual right to their state constitution, they added the main clause of the Second Amendment. The voters of The voters of Once more, “bear arms” is something that citizens can do “in defence of themselves,” and not only in defense of “the state.” Two Exceptions We have examined forty-two states where the right to keep and bear arms as expressed in the state constitutions have been consistently interpreted as protecting an individual right. In two states, however, the interpretation has shifted. The Except for the concurring opinion in the 1840 In 1979, In the nineteenth century, Today, Textually, the Massachusetts Constitution offers strong language for the anti-individual interpretation; the right is only “for the common defence”[clxxiv][179] and the right is in the same sentence as restrictions on standing armies, whereas the Second Amendment contains no such language. Also, the 1976 Current interpretation of the right to arms in V. Conclusion We have examined the text of the forty-four state constitutions which guarantee a right to arms. In forty-two of those states, we have found an unbroken interpretive mode: language identical to or similar to the federal Second Amendment that has been consistently interpreted as guaranteeing an individual right. This individual rights interpretation has prevailed even when the state constitution text denounces standing armies or mentions only "the common defense." Even then, the state arms guarantees have been held to protect individual rights. A fortiori, the federal Second Amendment -- which has no “standing army” language, and whose drafters specifically rejected the inclusion of a “for the common defence” clause -- also guarantees an individual right. In contrast to the standard of the forty-two states, we did find two states with an exception. In 1976, Clever attorneys can sometimes torture constitutional language to mean almost anything. But from 1776 until the present, we have seen that the American people, through the language they have created and revised for their state constitutions, have continued to use arms rights language in a remarkably consistent way. For well over two centuries, language similar or identical to the Second Amendment has been used to guarantee the right of law-abiding individuals, not just militiamen, to personally own and carry firearms. It is simply perverse to suggest that words which from century to century and from state to state have had such a widely-shared meaning in state constitutions, should have an entirely contrary meaning when the same words appear in the federal constitution. Browse or shop at Dave Kopel's Great Books and Great Movies pages. Copyright© 2002 [i][1] David Kopel received his B.A. with honors from Brown University, and his J.D., magna cum laude, from the University of Michigan Law School. Currently, he is the Research Director of the Independence Institute, a non-partisan, non-profit public policy research organization. He has also served as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Colorado and as a Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. Kopel is Editor-in-Chief of the Journal on Firearms and Public Policy, and he is a contributing editor of Gun Week and the magazine Gun News Digest. In 1999, the Citizen's Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms named Kopel the Gun Rights Defender of the Year. [ii][2] See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (using state constitutions as aid in interpreting cruel and unusual punishment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (using state constitutions to interpret guarantee against double jeopardy). [iii][3] Those states who have provided a right to arms guarantee are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The states that have not included an arms right provision in their state constitutions are: California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey and New York. All past and present state constitution arms rights guarantees may be found at Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [iv][4] For example, the rights of free exercise of religion and of freedom from religious discrimination are protected by only 34 state constitutions. See Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims and Defenses App. 4A-12 (1993). [v][5] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [vi][6] See U.S. Constitution: Amendments (visited Feb. 21, 2002) <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendments/html>. [vi][7] See id. [viii][8] Pa. Const. art. 1, sec. 21. [ix][9] Pa. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, cl. XIII. [x][10] See, e.g., David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History and Constitutional Change, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 589 (2000). [xi][11] Pa. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, cl. XIII; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 21. [xii][12] See, e.g., Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152 (Pa. 1996) (declaring that the individual right to possess firearms was a matter of statewide concern; therefore, the legislature’s preemption of local "assault weapon" ban was proper); (holding an act prohibiting carrying concealed weapons is consistent with the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, saving the right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state). [xiii][13] Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125, 150 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). [xiv][14] Id. [xv][15] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [xvi][16] Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 16. [xvii][17] State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903). [xviii][18] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [xix][19] N.C. Const. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § XVII. [xx][20] 1 Annals of Cong. 460 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). [xxi][21] N.C. Const. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § XVII. [xxii][22] Garry Wills, Why We Have No Right to Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. Rev. Books, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62. [xxiii][23] See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Wann, 530 F.2d 103,106 (6th Cir. 1976); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (all concluding the Second Amendment protects a collective right of the people to bear arms). [xxiv][24] See State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222 (N.C. 1921) (upholding constitutional right to possess ordinary rifles, shotguns and handguns). [xxv][25] N.C. Const. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § XVII. [xxvi][26] State v. Huntley, 25 N.C. 418, 422 (1843). See also State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250, 251 (1844) (upholding gun licensing law for free people of color only because they, unlike citizens, were not parties to the social compact); State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222 (N.C. 1921)(upholding constitutional right to possess ordinary rifles, shotguns, and handguns). [xxvii][27] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [xxviii][28] N.C. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 24. [xxix][29] See, e.g., , supra note 24 (pistol carrying license and bond requirement is unconstitutional); State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.3d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968) (stating the right is both individual and collective and is not infringed by punishment of persons who bear arms so as to deliberately disturb the peace). [xxx][30] In 1971, the North Carolina Constitution was reorganized, and the words “General Assembly” replaced “legislature” in the clause about controlling concealed weapons. Art. 1, § 30 (1971). [xxxi][31] See, e.g., Kerner, 107 S.E. 222 (N.C. 1921); see also State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968); State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 233 (N.C. 1989). [xxxii][32] See U.S. Constitution: Amendments (visited Feb. 21, 2002) <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendments.html>. [xxxiii][33] Ky. Const. of 1792, art. XII, § 23. [xxxiv][34] Id. (emphasis added). [xxxv][35] See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 92 (1822). [xxxvi][36] Ky. Const. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25. [xxxvii][37] Ky. Const. Bill of Rights sec. 1. [xxxviii][38] Order in Which States Joined the Union (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.brittanica.com/eb/article?eu=121257&tocid=214534>. [xxxix][39] Both states made slight alterations in punctuation and capitalization to conform to modern usage. [xl][40] Alaska Const. of 1959, art. I, § 19; Haw. Const. art. I, § 17. [xlii][42] U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. This section provides: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be mad, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. Id. [xliii][43] Alaska Const. art. I, § 19. “The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the State.” Id. [xliv][44] A local government is the creature of a state government, therefore, it cannot perform an act which the state government cannot. [xlv][45] Alaska Const. art I, § 19. [xlvi][46] The same as Alaska's 1959 language, without the 1994 Alaska addition. [xlvii][47] State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 363 n. 9 (Haw. 1996) (The court did not decide the question of what type of right the arms guarantee was, but noted that interpreting the arms right as both collective and individual, subject to state police power, would be consistent with the majority of other state constitutions); Morgan v. State, 943 P.2d 1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (holding right is not violated by prohibition on gun possession by citizens on probation). [xlvii][48]See generally Alaska Stat. § 18.65.700-790 (Michie 2000), Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-51 (1993) [xlviii][49] See State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (Haw. 1996). [xlix][50] S.C. Const. art. 1, § 20. (The South Carolina language makes some minor punctuation changes to the Second Amendment and to the North Carolina constitution). [l][51] Ala. Const. art. I, § 26 (“defence” changed to “defense” in 1901). [li][52] Id. [lii][53] Id. [liii][54] See Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387 (1858) (recognizing that restriction on individual concealed carrying of weapons raises a constitutional issue, but finding restriction to be constitutional); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 12 (1840) (declaring legislature has broad discretion in determining how arms may be borne; yet “A statute which, under the pretense of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional”). [liv][55] See Order in Which States Joined the Union (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.brittanica.com/eb/article?eu=121257&tocid=214534>. [lv][56] Wash. Const. art. I, § 24; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 26. (The Arizona version does not have commas around “or the state” and capitalizes “State”). For application, see City of Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (holding city’s restrictions on weapons in parks do not violate the right); City of Renton, 668 P.2d 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding restriction on possession of arms in places where alcohol is served). [lvi][57] See generally Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). [lvii][58] Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886). For analysis of Presser, see David B. Kopel, Cynthia Leonardatos and Stephen P. Halbrook, Miller versus Texas: Police Violence, Race Relations, Capital Punishment, and Gun-toting in Texas in the Nineteenth Century—and Today, 9 J. L. & Pol. 737 (2001); Stephen. Halbrook, The Right of Workers to Assemble and to Bear Arms: Presser v. Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 943 (1999). [lviii][59] Ark. Const. art. II, § 5 (modifying 1836 version by extending the right to citizens, rather than only whites). [lix][60] State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27 (1842). [lx][61] Id. at 32 (Dickinson, J., concurring). [lxi][62] Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 460-461 (1876); see also Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878). [lxii][63] See generally id. [lxiii][64] 31 Ark. 455 (1876). [lxiv][65] Id. at 460-61; see also (holding a statute making it a misdemeanor to carry a pistol except on a person’s own property or when traveling was an unwarranted restriction on right to bear arms). [lxv][66] 307 U.S. 174 (1939). [lxvi][67] Id. at 178. For more on Miller, see David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-five Other Second Amendment Cases, 18 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 99 (1999). [lxvii][68] Colo. Const. art. II, § 13. [lxviii][69] Id. [lxix][70] Id. [lxx][71] See, e.g,, Douglass v. Kelton, 610 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1980) (noting that individual right does not include concealed carry); Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (ruling against civil liability for firearms retailer, noting “The right to bear arms is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Colorado Constitution, subject to the valid exercise of police power”); (restrictions on firearms sale, possession, and carrying were too broad); (prohibition of firearm possession by lawful aliens is unconstitutional). [lxxi][72] Conn. Const. art. I, § 15. [lxxii][73] See, e.g., State v. Wilchinski, 700 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a narrow construction of home gun storage law, so as to avoid constitutional issue); Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995) (declaring state constitution guarantees right to possess arms for personal defense, but right is not violated by ban on assault weapons). [lxxiii][74] Del. Const. art. I, § 20. [lxxiii][75] Id. [lxxiv][76] Fla. Const. art. I, § 8. Sections (b)‑(d) were adopted in 1990. These sections provide: (b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding weekends and legal holidays, between the purchase and delivery at retail of any handgun. For the purposes of this section, “purchase” means the transfer of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and “handgun” means a firearm capable of being carried and used by one hand, such as a pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph. Id. [lxxv][77] Fla. Const. of 1838, art. I, § 21. [lxxvi][78] Fla. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 22. [lxxvii][79] Fla. Const. of 1885, art. I, § 20. [lxxviii][80] Decisions affirming the individual right, while upholding particular controls, include: Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1972) (prohibiting machine guns); Nelson v. State, 195 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1967) (Banning possession of certain weapons by convicted felons); Davis v. State, 146 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1962) (requiring a license to carry certain weapons); Carlton v. State, 58 So. 480 (1912) (restricting concealed carry). [lxxix][81] Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. VIII. Cf. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874) (interpreting 1868 state constitutional language as an individual right, but the legislature may ban the bearing of arms in courthouses). [lxxx][82] See Rhodes v. R.G. Industries, Inc. 325 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (dismissing strict liability action against handgun manufacturers because the Second Amendment guarantees the right of people to keep and bear arms, as does the Georgia Constitution). [lxxxi][83] Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) [lxxxii][84] Id.; see generally also Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (1998)(explaining Nunn as part of a group of antebellum decisions applying the Bill of Rights to the states). Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin, author of the Nunn opinion, is recognized as one of the leading State Supreme Court judges of the nineteenth century. For more information on his career see ; ; The Story of Georgia 243 (Am. Historical Soc’y 1938). [lxxxiii][85] Except for the lone concurring opinion from State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842). [lxxxiv][86] See generally David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1359 (1998). [lxxxv][87][lxxxv] Idaho Const. art. I, § 11. [lxxxvi][88] In re Brickey, 70 P. 609 (Idaho 1902); see also State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72 (Idaho 1945); State v. Woodward, 74 P.2d 92 (Idaho 1937); Jennings v. State, 5 . [lxxxvi][89] Ill. Const. art. I, § 22. [lxxxviii][90] See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984) (relying on special circumstances of legislative history of the Illinois provision, the court held the individual right is not violated by handgun ban). [lxxxix][91] Ind. Const. art. I, § 32. [xc][92] Ind. Const. of 1816, art. I, § 20. [xcii][94]See, e.g., Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. 1990); Gaddis v. State, 680 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (right includes the substantive right to carry a handgun with a license); Mcintyre v. State, 83 N.E. 1005 (Ind. 1908) (upholding restrictions on concealed weapons and emphasizing similarity of 1816 and 1851 arms rights); Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (holding an applicant for license to carry a handgun for self-protection could not be denied for lack of a proper reason unless that person has been convicted of a felony or crime of violence). [xciii][95] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [xciv][96] La. Const. art. I, § 11. [xcv][97]Other states which have similar provisions include: , Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, and North Carolina; see also , Georgia, Tennessee and Texas Constitutions (power to regulate all types of arms carrying). [xcvi][98] E.g., State v. Hamlin, 497 So.2d 1369 (La. 1986) (restricting sawed-off shotguns does not violate the individual right). [xcvii][99] See generally State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856). [xcviii][100] Me. Const. of 1819, art. I, § 16. [xcix][101] . [c][102] Me. Const. art. I, § 16. [ci][103] Mich. Const. art. I, § 6. [ciii][105] See, e.g., People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927 (Mich. 1922) (prohibition on unnaturalized, foreign-born residents possessing a firearm is unconstitutional); People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1931) (“The protection of the constitution is not limited to militiamen nor military purposes, in terms, but extends to every person to bear arms for the defense of himself as well as of the state.”); see also State v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). [civ][106] Miss. Const. art. III, § 12. [cv][107] Mo. Const. art. I, § 23. [cvi][108] Mo. Const. of 1820, art. XIII, § 3. [cvii][109] Id. [cviii][110] 92 U.S. 542 (1876). [cix][111] Id. at 555. [cx][112] Art. II, § 12 (1889; readopted 1972). [cx][113] See Colo. Const. art. II, § 13. [cxi][114] Neb. Const. art. I, § 1. [cxii][115] N.D. Const. art. I, § 1. [cxiii][116] See, e.g., Kasprowicz v. Finck, 574 N.W.2d 564 (N.D. 1998); State v. Richhill, 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987) (both holding that North Dakota’s right is individual and subject to reasonable regulation); State v. LaChapelle, 449 N.W.2d 762 (Neb. 1990) (holding Nebraska’s right as individual, but upholding restriction on short shotguns). [cxiv][117] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 states in part: To provide for calling for the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions. See also Don B. Kates, Second Amendment, in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 1639 (Leonard Levy ed., 1986); Joyce Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 285 (1983). [cxv][118] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm> [cxvi][119] Nev. Const. art. I, § 11(1). [cxvii][120] N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 2‑a. [cxviii][121] N.M. Const. of 1912, art. II, § 6. [cxix][122] N.M. Const. art. II, § 6 [cxx][123] Id. [cxxi][124] Id. [cxxii][125] City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 485 P.2d 737 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (declaring void a gun carrying ordinance making it unlawful for any person to carry a deadly weapon, concealed or otherwise, within the corporation limits of the municipality). [cxxiii][126] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [cxxiv][127] Ohio Const. art. I, § 4. [cxxv][128] Ohio Const. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20. [cxxvi][129] See N.M. Const. of 1912, art.II, § 6. [cxxvii][130] See, e.g., (upholding "assault weapon” ban as reasonable regulation of the right to possess certain firearms for defense of self and property); In re Reilly, 31 Ohio Dec. 364 (C.P. 1919) (striking ordinance forbidding hiring armed guard to protect property); see also David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer & Scott Hattrup, A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State Courts, 68 Temple L. Rev. 1177 (1995) (discussing jurisprudence in Colorado, Ohio, and Oregon). [cxxviii][131] Okla. Const. art. II, § 26. [cxxix][132] Or. Const. art. I, § 27. [cxxx][133] Barnett v. State, 695 P.2d 991 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding a prohibition on black jacks was unconstitutional); (holding a prohibition on switchblade knives was unconstitutional); (holding that possession of a billy club in public was protected by constitutional right to bear arms); (possessing a billy club in own home is protected by right to bear arms provision of Oregon Constitution). [cxxxi][134] See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 4 (1849). [cxxxii][135] See generally id. [cxxxiii][136] R.I. Const. art. I, § 22. [cxxxiv][137] S.D. Const. art. VI, § 24. [cxxxv][138] Tenn. Const. of 1796, art. XI, § 26. (In 1836, “freemen” was changed to “free white citizens,” thereby preventing the assertion of the right to arms by free blacks. The North Carolina Supreme Court was forced to confront this issue in 1843.) See State v. Huntley, 25 N.C. 418 (1843). [cxxxvi][139] Tenn. Const. art. I, § 26. [cxxxvii][140] Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 157 (1840). [cxxxviii][141] See id. at 158. [cxxxix][142] Id. at 160. [cxl][143] See Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214 (1866). [cxli][144] 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871). [cxlii][145] Id. at 177. [cxliii][146] I.e., as someone who may be called upon to participate in the common defense. [cxliv][147]50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 178-79. [cxlv][148] Id. at 162. [cxlvi][149]Id. at 182 (emphasis in original). [cxlvii][150] For post-Andrews jurisprudence, see, e.g., Glasscock v. (Tenn. 1928) (holding an ordinance unconstitutional that made carrying a pistol a misdemeanor on the basis it violated the citizens’ right to keep and bear arms); State v. Foutch, 34 S.W.1, 6 (Tenn. 1896) (holding the prosecution of a man who shot a home invader was unconstitutional, the court said, “Under our constitution every citizen of the State has the right to keep and bear arms for his proper defense and the Legislature only has power by law to regulate the wearing of arms to prevent crime”). [cxlviii][151] Tex. Const. art. I, § 23. Earlier provisions of the right provided: “Every citizen shall have the right to bear arms in defence of himself and the republic. The military shall at all times and in all cases be subordinate to the civil power.” Tex. Const. of 1836, Declaration of Rights, cl. 14. “Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in lawful defence of himself or the State.” Tex. Const. of 1845, art. I, § 13. For an interpretation, see Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394 (1859) (interpreting this provision as an individual right in a case upholding additional punishment for use of a knife in a homicide). “Every person shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defence of himself or the State, under such regulations as the legislature may prescribe.” Tex. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 13. For an interpretation, see English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872) (interpreting this provision as an individual right, but not as encompassing dirks and bowie knives). [cxlix][152] 5 Tex. App. 298 (1878). [cl][153] Utah Const. of 1896, art. 1, § 6. [cli][154] See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions (visited Feb. 20, 2002) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm>. [clii][155] Utah Const. art. I, § 6. [cliii][156] Va. Const. of 1776. [cliv][157] Id. at art. I, § 13. [clv][158] Va. Const. art. I, § 13. [clvi][159] Id. [clvi][160] W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22. For an application, see State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W.Va. 1988) (holding unconstitutional a law banning carrying a concealed weapon and making no provision for obtaining a permit). [clvii][161]Wis. Const. art. I, § 25. [clvii][162] See 1998 Election Results (visited Feb. 21, 2002) <http://www.legis.state.wi.us/leginfo/ref_cbc.pdf>. [clviii][163] See David Lamb, Anti-Drug Mood in Oregon; Most Abortion Curbs Fail; Five States Pass Lotteries, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1986 at pt.1, p. 20. [clix][164] See generally Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 291, 338 (2000); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551 (1991) (arguing that modern society does not share the founders’ distrust of standing armies, thus what the Second Amendment accomplished in 1789 has now become irrelevant). [clx][165] Wyo. Const. art. I, § 24. [clxi][166] Kan. Const. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 4. [clxii][167] City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905). [clxiii][168] Id. [clxiv][169] See generally id. [clxv][170] State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1840). [clxvii][172] See generally Michael Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 83 J. Am. Hist. 425 (1996). [clxvii][173] One precedent cited was Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822), discussed infra p. 5. [clxx][175] Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145 (Kan. 1979). [clxxi][176] Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. 17. [clxxii][177] Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825) (right to keep arms is an individual right); (ordinary individual may invoke arms right, but right does not include mass armed parades in public). [clxxiii][178] Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976). [clxxiv][179] This restriction was rejected in U.S. Senate debate on the proposed federal Second Amendment. See 1 Annals of Cong. 460 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). [clxxv][180] See Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976). [clxxvi][181] See Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905). |
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